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THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE: 
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 
 
WOLFGANG STREECK 
MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES, COLOGNE 
 
European industrial relations are rapidly internationalizing; 
internationalization, however, is not necessarily de-nationalization.
1 Even as 
European integration accelerates, national politics and industrial relations will, for 
better or worse, remain the principal arenas for the social regulation of work and 
employment in Europe. This is because over the course of four decades, European 
integration has come to be to firmly defined as a process of economic liberalization 
by international means, that is, the opening-up of national economies through 
internationally negotiated expansion of markets beyond national borders. Associated 
with this was the evolution of a now well established pattern of selective 
supranational centralization and institution-building, which dedicates supranational 
institutions primarily to purposes of market-making while leaving social regulation 
essentially a national responsibility. As a result, social regulation becomes itself 
exposed to competitive market pressures, which further advances liberalization. 
By the time of the Treaty of Rome, the preferred approach for the integration 
of the European economy, and presumably European society, had become the 
integration of markets, and no longer of planning authorities on the older model of the 
European Community for Coal and Steel (Haas 1958). Market integration required 
primarily the removal of trade barriers widely defined. To ensure the lasting 
compliance of national governments, an initially uncertain measure of institutional 
integration was required under which member states had to subject themselves to the 
authority of supranational institutions. But it soon became apparent that an integrated 
 
1Revised and expanded version of the closing address at the European Regional Congress of 
the International Industrial Relations Association, Dublin, August 26-29, 1997. Parts of the 
paper were presented as a lecture at the International Studies and the Western European Area 
Studies programs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, September 24, 1997. I am grateful 
to Werner Eichhorst, Ute Knaak and Philip Manow for comment and criticism. Responsibility 
for any remaining flaws rests with me.  
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international market economy could be instituted and maintained well short of 
instituting an integrated supranational state.
2 Ultimately this made possible a lasting 
dissociation of international economic integration from supranational state-building. 
As economic integration became identical with liberalization, it became ipso facto 
compatible with national sovereignty, reducing the institutions of integrated Europe to 
the role of a supranational liberalization engine: while extricating the European 
economy from national political control by turning it into an international economy, 
they at the same time extricate it from political control generally as the international 
economy that they construct has no integrated state confronting it.
3 
 The  elective affinity between nationalism and liberalism that has deeply 
shaped the logic of European integration (Streeck 1996) has many facets. Continued 
national fragmentation of political sovereignty in an internationally integrated market 
accords with economic interests that would have to fear the interventionist tendencies 
of a unified supranational state. Vice versa, limiting economic integration to market-
making, with the institutional minimalism at supranational level this makes possible, 
is in the interest of those that have a stake in the survival of national institutions and 
national sovereignty. Just as integration-defined-as-liberalization gives the nation-
state a further lease on life, national fragmentation of sovereignty and 
intergovernmentalism favor liberalization as the privileged method of European 
integration. In fact arguably economic interests and institutions differ so widely 
between European countries, and national identities continue to be so firmly 
established, that anything like supranational state-building was probably always 
unrealistic for this reason alone, a priori establishing international liberalization as 
the principal method of integration. 
  As has often been shown, negative integration through removal of barriers to 
trade and mobility is generally easier for sovereign countries to agree to than positive 
 
2Pace the „spill-over” theories of practicing neo-functionalists from Monnet to Delors, who 
believed and believe in state formation as an inevitable consequence of market integration, a 
practical theory that applies, if at all, only in a Shonfieldian world of „organized capitalism.” 
3European integration is not the only cause of the liberalization and internationalization of 
European economies, certainly not since the 1980s. But given its early established 
institutional logic, it is much better suited to reinforcing than to counter-balancing external or 
internal liberalization pressures.  
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integration through the building of common institutions.
4 It also had the support of 
powerful forces inside national systems keen on pushing back government 
intervention, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. These frequently included national 
governments themselves who were no longer willing or able to take responsibility for 
their economies. To them, the depoliticization of the economy that is brought about 
by international liberalization represented an opportunity to withdraw from their 
postwar economic responsibilities, without having to turn them over to an 
international super-state potentially contesting their political monopoly. In any case, 
once the process of international market expansion had started, it was clearly in most 
countries’ interest not to be excluded from it, and this overrode concerns, where they 
existed at all, about the liberalization that came with it. Especially in the formative 
years of the integration process, given the obvious economic benefits of trade 
expansion and the equally obvious impediments to supranational state-formation, the 
liberalization path of European integration was never seriously in question. 
  Today European integration has resulted in a complex new configuration of 
national and international institutions and markets. National political systems, far 
from having disappeared, have come to be enveloped in a unified market on the one 
hand and in international market-enforcing institutions on the other. With respect to 
the latter, while popular and state sovereignty have remained vested in a multitude of 
nation-states, economic governance has increasingly been taken over by integrated 
supranational agencies charged with, for example, the enforcement of a joint 
competition regime (Schmidt 1997) and, soon to come, the administration of a 
common currency. Their insulation from political pressures, enabling them to operate 
in the mode of technocratic regulatory authorities, simultaneously protects the 
political monopoly of the nation-states and enshrines the liberal character of the 
integrated economy. So does the centralization of market-making institutions 
 
4See Scharpf in Marks et al. (1996, 15ff.). The same can be said for liberalization generally. 
In an interdependent international economy, for a country to stay aloof if others are 
liberalizing their markets is likely to be costly. In fact, it may be enough to make all other 
countries liberalize if just one country does, like the UK in banking and telecommunications 
or the US in labor relations during the 1980s. There are no comparable first-mover advantages 
in constraining markets; indeed first movers are likely to be punished by „market forces“. 
This asymmetry makes liberalization largely self-enforcing (Héritier 1997).  
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compared to the decentralization and fragmentation of the traditional institutions of 
political sovereignty. The result is a multi-level political economy, where politics is 
decentralized in national institutions located in and constrained by integrated 
competitive markets far extending beyond their territorial reach, and where 
supranationally centralized institutions are primarily dedicated to implementing and 
maintaining those markets.
5 
  That European integration as we know it amounts in its core to economic 
liberalization is closely associated with its constitutive mismatch between the 
institutional range of political sovereignty and the size of the integrated market; with 
decentralization of politics coinciding with centralization of market-making; and with 
the embedding of national political institutions in an international market which 
exposes them to pressures of regime competition, both forcing and enabling national 
governments to push back demands for political „distortion“ of that market. European 
integration has in this way injected a hitherto unknown degree of competition, not just 
into the European economy, but also into the exercise of public authority over it, 
which may in fact be its most important contribution to liberalization. Given the 
strong interests vested in its particular pattern of institutional centralization and 
decentralization, international and national politics, technocratic and political 
governance, and market-making and market-constraining rules
6 -- and given the long 
historical evolution of this pattern as well as its confirmation in the Treaties of 
Maastricht and Amsterdam -- it seems misleading to conceive of the multi-level polity 
of integrated Europe as of a federal system-in-waiting: that is, of an institutional 
superstructure that will ultimately develop a unified capacity to suspend internal 
competition in the service of social cohesion. In reality, the multi-level political 
system of the European Union seems by now to have firmly established itself as a 
liberalization regime dedicated to enhancing competition and freeing market forces 
 
5On Europe as a multi-level polity see the seminal paper by Scharpf (1988). For a more 
comprehensive application of the concept see Marks et al. (1996), where the concept is, 
however, not used consistently by the authors. 
6Where the central level of governance is an international arena of intergovernmental 
relations, functionally limited to the implementation and regulation of an international market, 
while politics and the social control of markets remain decentralized in a set of nation-states 
under market pressures and international obligations not to obstruct free trade.  
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from political interference, and indeed one that has become sufficiently settled to be 
largely self-reproductive and capable of conditioning its own further evolution. 
  In trying to understand the institutional logic of European integration, it is 
important not to confuse liberalization with deregulation. While international 
liberalization in particular does require the removal of a large body of rules, 
especially national rules obstructing free trade, usually new rules must be created to 
make the new international markets work. These include, for example, an 
international competition regime which must outlaw „state aids“ by participating 
countries to national industries, and force countries to allow foreign competition to 
enter formerly closed sectors. Also required may be centralized regulation to prevent 
market failure, from standardization to product safety. As Steven Vogel (1996) has 
shown for liberalization generally, and Giandomenico Majone (1994) for the 
European Union, freer markets often come with more rules and sometimes with large 
regulatory machineries. That European integration is closely associated with 
extensive rule-making is therefore not at all proof that it is not in its core a process of 
liberal market-making.  
 Moreover,  liberalization also calls forth demands for social re-regulation, to 
enable individuals and communities to cope with the uncertainties of free markets and 
stabilize their social existence in dynamically changing economic conditions. 
Regulation and re-regulation are particularly closely intertwined in labor markets, 
owing to the peculiar characteristics of labor as a commodity. Free labor markets 
require what Marshall (1964) has called „civil rights” of citizenship, allowing 
individuals voluntarily to engage in contractual relations. But as the latter expand, 
their transforming impact on social life and the distinctive logic of social structures 
and norms of social justice give rise to counter-movements for social protection 
(Polanyi 1957 (1944), deploying „politics against markets“ (Esping-Andersen 1985) 
and making social re-regulation almost as much part of the liberalization of labor 
markets, although a dialectical one, as deregulation and regulation. 
  Industrial relations have therefore always, although to varying degrees, been 
governed by rules, not just of contract, but also of status (Streeck 1992): rules that 
impose rights and obligations on contracting parties that these are not allowed to  
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modify by mutual agreement. Rules of status, or „industrial” and „social” rights, as 
Marshall calls them, protect social integration by limiting the reach of contract and 
the market. As they cannot--by definition--spring from the free play of market forces, 
they must be created by public intervention. It is true that in industrial relations, 
market-constraining intervention, or re-regulation, is not easily distinguished from 
market-making intervention, or regulation, and not just because both depend on public 
power. In labor markets the prevention of market failure and the promotion of social 
justice may sometimes blend into one another, as strongly felt injustice on the part of 
workers may detract as much or more from the efficiency of markets and 
organizational hierarchies as, for example, lack of information or contract 
enforcement. To this extent, what is an efficient organization of the labor market 
depends in part on what is perceived to be a fair organization. This is why it is 
sometimes possible rhetorically to defend redistributive intervention in labor markets 
as a means to enhance economic efficiency, or social reconstruction as a contribution 
to market-making.
7 But this does not abolish the generic distinction between 
intervention expanding the range of market relations, and intervention limiting market 
relations and embedding them in social constraints. 
  In the multi-level institutional structure of integrated Europe, pressures for 
political defense of social cohesion tend to be deflected to national systems and are 
mostly compartmentalized in them, given that supranational institutions are far 
removed from and structurally de-sensitized to such pressures. Obviously the extent 
to which such pressures can be satisfied at national level is strictly circumscribed by 
internationally institutionalized competition rules and market-driven regime 
competition. But from this it does not follow that with the progress of European 
integration, social protection will ultimately become a centralized supranational 
responsibility. Although the capacities for national re-regulation in the European 
multi-level polity are clearly inferior to what they were in the more self-contained 
nation-state of the postwar period, all this may mean is that in the way integrated 
Europe has come to be constituted, the balance of forces between market expansion 
and social reconstruction may for a long time have shifted against the latter. 
 
7Remember the way Jacques Delors argued for the „social dimension“ of the European Union  
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  Summing up so far, the liberal bias of Europe’s multi-level polity resides in 
the fact that its central level is an international political arena governed by 
intergovernmental relations and technocratic agencies, while politics proper is 
confined to a set of nation-states located on its lower, decentral level. The result is a 
wide gap in the development of market-making and market-correcting institutions in 
the political economy of integrated Europe. Intergovernmentalism and technocratic 
regulation are more congenial to negative integration and the expansion of markets 
and competition than to positive integration and the social containment of 
competition. The resulting policy predispositions, and the policy legacies of the 
successful liberalization projects of the past, are defended by strong interests, 
strengthened in turn by the way in which the European institutional cards are stacked: 
national interests in preserving the nation-state, which are congenial to a 
liberalization mode of integration, as well as economic interests in an unfettered free 
international market, which are best served if national sovereignty is not replaced 
with supranational sovereignty. 
  While institutions make some outcomes more probable than others, however, 
they do not determine them. Outcomes and, indeed, institutions themselves can be 
contested. This is clearly the case in Europe, where attempts have never ceased to 
politicize supranational governance and push social re-regulation upwards from the 
national to the European level. Such attempts may try to capitalize on practical 
uncertainties as to the extent to which political consensus, trust and legitimacy may be 
a precondition for an efficient management of markets and organizations -- in other 
words, as to how much social re-regulation is required for markets to be viable in a 
democratic society. Moreover, what precisely the range of practical possibilities is for 
social reconstruction within nation-states under regime competition is largely 
unexplored, given the recency of the problem and the continued evolution of the 
European polity. 
 
European Industrial Relations as a Multi-level System 
  The character of the European integration process, stuck in the middle 
 
by reminding sceptical national governments that „one cannot fall in love with a market.”  
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between intergovernmentalism and supranational state formation (Marks et al. 1996a; 
Pollack 1996), has profound consequences for industrial relations in Europe, and 
especially for national industrial relations. 
 
1. Most importantly, European industrial relations are not about to become identical 
with supranational industrial relations. European-wide harmonization and 
centralization of industrial relations are blocked by the same factors that inhibit 
supranational state formation, as well as by the delay of the latter as such. Any 
attempt at harmonization faces the problem of wide, historically grown diversity of 
national institutions (Visser and Ebbinghaus 1992), which not only raises often 
insurmountable technical difficulties but also leads to harmonization having 
asymmetrical consequences in different countries; usually this is enough to call forth 
sufficient opposition to prevent it. Moreover, as to unionization, the inhibiting effects 
of wide differences in national economic conditions and interests are reinforced by 
the absence of facilitating state capacity at European level, which in turn reinforce the 
primacy of national forms of organization. Unions also lack strong interlocutors at 
European level, as employers can best pursue their interest in international 
liberalization by holding back on supranational organization and negotiation.
8 
  One implication of this is that the emerging European-level institutions of 
industrial relations are not about to develop into a replica of a national industrial 
relations system on a larger scale. Studying them in the way of a look-alike contest, by 
comparing the Social Dialogue to national corporatist arrangements(Michael Gold 
1992; Manfred Weiss 1990), the sectoral dialogues either to industry-wide collective 
bargaining or to industrial policy boards(Jon Erik Dolvik 1997), and European works 
councils to company-level collective bargaining committees or works councils under 
the German „dual system“(Michael Gold and Mark Hall 1994; Paul Marginson, and 
Sisson, Keith 1996), is misleading. Nor does it make much sense to try to identify the 
national system -- the French, the British, the German -- that the new European 
institutions most closely resemble. European institutions of industrial relations will for 
all practical purposes always coexist with national institutions and perform their 
 
8On this see the Appendix to my chapter in Marks et al. (1996).  
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functions, whatever they may be, only in interaction with these. Moreover, as national 
systems are different, that interaction will differ from country to country, and so will 
the significance for the regulation of the employment relationship of its new European 
dimension. Far from being about to consolidate into an integrated supranational 
regime, European industrial relations have developed into a multi-level system that 
matches and complements the multi-level institutions that have come to govern most 
of public policy-making in Europe. 
 
2. It has by now become almost commonplace that social protection in Europe will for 
a long time remain primarily a national matter (early: Pelkmans 1985). Attempts at 
harmonization, aimed at establishing common standards and taking them out of the 
market, have largely been given up, in recognition of the limited supranational 
capacities available for this. But there have also been few examples, if any, of 
European regulation mandating deregulation of industrial relations at national level. In 
some cases, supranational regulations, like the „Christophersen-clause”
9 in various 
European Directives,
10 are specifically designed to preserve the diversity of national 
institutions. But lack of formal institutional intervention „from above” does not mean 
that national systems are likely to remain unchanged. At least two sorts of pressures 
for national adjustment can be identified, one issuing from a changed institutional 
environment of national industrial relations, and the other from expanded 
internationalized markets. Both reflect the embedding of national systems of industrial 
relations in the integrated European political economy:
11 
 
(1) The pattern of selective centralization that is characteristic of European integration 
has substantially affected the capacities of national industrial relations systems. For 
example, with monetary policy centralized, fiscal policy in the straight-jacket of an 
 
9Bercusson and van Dijk (1995). 
10According to which member states can delegate the national implemetation of a European 
directive to the social partners, provided these can ensure that they can achieve the results the 
directive prescribes. 
11In other words, they reflect the fact that in integrated Europe, national industrial relations 
systems are horizontally linked to each other through market relations, and vertically linked to 
a supranational system through institutional relations.  
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international „stability pact,” and employment policy internationally defined as a 
national responsibility, the only remaining way by which countries may be able to 
match demand and supply in their labor markets may be by enhancing the „flexibility” 
of the latter, very likely requiring deep changes in industrial relations. While on the 
surface these will appear to be strictly national choices, they can only be explained in 
the context of the multi-level governance system in which national systems are 
contained. 
 
(2) International liberalization has exposed national systems of economic governance 
to regime competition, in part precisely to the extent that they remained at first 
unchanged. As markets expand, national institutions find themselves constrained to 
accommodate market forces beyond their control. In particular, with the attrition of 
national borders, internationally mobile production factors increasingly have the 
option of „voting with their feet” if national institutions and their distributive results 
are not to their liking. At the very least, the ensuing competition between countries, 
especially of course for capital, strengthens the voice inside national systems of those 
capable of abandoning them.
12 By changing the balance of power within national 
institutions, regime competition changes the substance of the policies these generate. 
In the longer run, the same pressures may lead to institutional reforms aimed at 
enhancing the „competitiveness” of national regimes. But even without formal 
reorganization, European integration, by locating national systems of industrial 
relations in an international market, makes them pay more attention to the demands of 
„market forces” (Streit 1995). 
It is important to note that the recasting of national industrial relations by regime 
competition does not presuppose much actual movement of production factors or 
production across national borders (Gerda Falkner 1993). Given the vital importance 
for national economic well-being of internationally mobile supply and demand, the 
mere potentiality of such movement, and the credible threats it makes possible, are 
enough to tip the balance. Nor does regime competition require wide differences in 
wages or production costs, like those between developed and developing countries; in 
 
12The possibility that increased chances of exit may make voice more effective has been  
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fact, it seems more common between countries of comparable productivity -- where its 
main effect, rather than actual cross-border mobility, is the elimination of slack 
resulting in higher competitiveness, if not productivity, in each of the countries 
concerned.
13 
 
3. Within the multi-level European industrial relations regime, supranational 
intervention in national systems is typically restricted to their coordination. The model 
seems to be the European Union’s successful legislation on mobility of labor, which 
obliged countries to abolish impediments to cross-national movement while otherwise 
leaving national labor market regimes untouched (Streeck 1995). A recent example of 
this approach in industrial relations is the European Works Councils Directive.
14 
Avoiding interference with existing national systems of workplace representation, the 
Directive supplements them with, largely firm-specific, representation arrangements 
for non-domestic European workers at the headquarters of multinational companies. 
Normally but not necessarily, these provide for a common European minimum of 
representation to workers in European subsidiaries outside the company’s home 
country. Instead of trying to harmonize national systems, the Directive thus in effect 
extends them into their European environments.
15 
  Supranational coordination does oblige national systems to make institutional 
amendments, its commitment to the preservation of national diversity notwithstanding. 
But given precisely that diversity, the impact of supra-nationally mandated change on 
national institutions must differ between countries. European works councils mean 
different things when implanted in the institutional environments of, say, Britain as 
compared to Germany, and integrating them in these requires different adjustments. As 
the British domestic debate on European works councils shows, there is even a 
possibility that European legislation may set in motion changes far beyond what would 
have been its original intentions. But as such changes result from the grafting of a new 
„European” institution on existing national institutions, they are at least as likely to be 
 
pointed out by Hirschmann in his analysis of the demise of the DDR (Hirschmann 1995). 
13On some of the functions and dysfunctions of regime competition in Europe see Scharpf 
(1997). 
14For a general overview see  Hall et al. (1995).  
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conditioned by the latter as by the former. 
 
4. The main difference between harmonization and coordination in multi-level 
industrial relations is that the former suspends internal regime competition while the 
latter does not. As pointed out, regime competition is likely to give rise to -- 
uncoordinated -- adaptive change in national systems. Just as supranational 
coordination, the market pressures that issue from regime competition operate on 
highly heterogeneous initial conditions. Harmonization by market forces, through the 
adoption by all member countries of a single „best practice” model of industrial 
relations, therefore seems as improbable as harmonization by international 
institutional mandate. Very likely, successful adjustment to the new competitive 
conditions, even to the extent that these are in fact the same for all countries, will 
require different, „functionally equivalent” responses depending, above all, on 
countries’ initial institutional endowments. Here, too, change tends to be path-
dependent and to preserve institutional diversity.
16 
  Still, the simultaneous operation upon national systems of both supranational 
institutional pressures for coordination and international market pressures for 
competitiveness raises the issue of cross-national convergence. This, of course, is an 
old theme in the comparative study of industrial relations. Its origin lay in the postwar 
period and in the practical question of whether „free collective bargaining“, one of the 
core principles of the American New Deal, could be successfully transplanted to the 
defeated nations of Europe and Asia, or might even arise there spontaneously with the 
progress of „industrialism“ (Dunlop 1958; Kerr et al. 1960). Comparative research, 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s, rejected the received „convergence theories” of the 
1950s by pointing to persistent institutional differences between countries (Goldthorpe 
1984). But what was easily overlooked was that such differences, politically and 
economically important as they were, were differences within a family -- that of 
„Fordist” industrial relations systems; they existed, and indeed were identifiable, only 
 
15Streeck (1997). For more on this see infra. 
16On the improbability of „best practice convergence” see Hollingsworth and Streeck (1994). 
Also consider the succession of leading „national models“ in industrial relations that other 
countries  were supposed to emulate but never could or would: first the U.S., then for a time  
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on the background of equally important commonalties.
17 One lesson from this debate 
for the study of industrial relations in the European Union is that differences in 
national industrial relations systems can be properly understood only in the context of 
their interaction with general tendencies -- in the present case, with a changing overall 
relationship between markets and institutions in Europe’s multi-level polity. 
 
5. Given capital’s new exit options, national industrial relations in all European 
countries alike seem to be becoming more voluntaristic and less obligational, in the 
sense that unions and governments are relying less on sanctions and more on 
incentives to get concessions from employers. The increased bargaining power of 
capital that is behind this is reflected in the governance of employment relations 
becoming more pro-competitive, in that material rewards for workers and institutional 
influence for labor are more than before tied to acceptance of a joint commitment with 
employers to success in competitive markets. This does not necessarily make European 
industrial relations labor-exclusive in a structural sense; what is far more radically 
changing than their -- nationally divergent -- structures are their functions. Today the 
majority of European employers, rather than trying to exclude organized labor, seem to 
be content with changing the terms of its inclusion, by lowering its costs and 
increasing its returns. While the former is done through all sorts of concession 
bargaining „in the shadow of exit,” the latter involves utilizing existing institutions of 
industrial relations as substructures of intensified communication and cooperation at 
the workplace, saving firms the costs of building such structures on their own and 
enabling them to benefit from past, often involuntary investment in „social consensus.” 
To the extent that on balance labor inclusion still causes costs, these are pragmatically 
compared to the probable costs of a conflictual transition to managerial unilaterialism -
- costs that, again, differ between countries as they depend largely on labor’s 
institutionalized strength. 
  In the process a new European „peace formula” between capital and labor 
 
„Modell Deutschland,” later Japan, and now again the U.S. 
17This, incidentally, explains why the controversy between the proponents of divergence and 
convergence was never resolved: since both tendencies were simultaneously present, and had 
to be for the question to make sense in the first place, it all depended on which aspects of  
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seems to be emerging that is gradually taking the place of the postwar formula of full 
employment and continuous income growth at constant distribution.
18 In its stead it 
emphasizes the sharing of economic risk and responsibility in a less predictable 
environment, and the joint search for „win-win” strategies in competitive markets. 
With a slight exaggeration it would appear that, while in the past industrial relations 
was about negotiating a secure status for workers and unions, insulating these from 
economic fluctuations, in the national industrial relations systems of today -- deeply 
enmeshed in competitive international markets as they are -- it is about adjusting the 
governance of the employment relationship to the imperatives of joint competitive 
success. 
  That European employers are for the time being not inclined to seek 
competitiveness through labor exclusion is in part because of the uncertain risks of 
industrial conflict, given the strength many European unions continue to derive from 
the national institutions of the postwar period. It may in addition reflect certain 
consensus requirements of high-performance work organizations. But clearly it is also 
because unions in almost all European countries are more or less willing to subscribe 
to the new peace formula, if only to prevent restructuring for competitiveness 
proceeding without them. As competitiveness rises to the status of a „hegemonic 
concept” in European industrial relations (van Apeldoorn 1998), employers are willing 
to take unions along on the road to restructuring, at both national and company level, 
sometimes supported by labor-inclusive supranational policies and institutions and 
sometimes not. While the functional requirements of joint competitiveness may not 
always be entirely clear, as long as unions are willing to accept the principle that labor-
inclusive industrial relations are premised on competitive restructuring, European 
employers seem to be prepared not to draw the usefulness of labor inclusion in 
question. 
 
6. One long-term consequence of the competitive restructuring of national industrial 
relations seems to be that their capacity as sources of social protection is declining. As 
unions internalize the imperatives of competitiveness, and firms are less able or willing 
 
reality one was willing to include in the picture.  
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to devote resources to purposes other than the pursuit of competitive success, work 
rules that place a ceiling on employee effort are disappearing or remain unenforced. So 
are solidaristic wage regimes that, for the sake of reducing inequality, overpay workers 
at the lower end of the wage scale while underpaying them at the upper end. Similarly, 
as firms eliminate slack to make themselves „fit for competition,” employment 
regimes are waning that provided niches for less productive workers; were tolerant of a 
moderate degree of over-manning; and were less than perfectly sensitive to changes in 
demand, thus generating employment, and employment security, somewhat above and 
beyond what „the market” required. 
  With consensual restructuring largely eliminating social protection from the 
negotiated responsibilities of the firm, unions apparently continue to be able to express 
and protect the interests of core workforces, for example but not exclusively in training 
or in high wages. At the same time, the competitive downsizing of firms and an 
increasingly lean organization of work externalizes many of the protective functions 
that used to be performed by Fordist industrial relations, and turns them over to society 
at large and to the social policy of the state. In the process, a rising number of people -- 
from the long-term unemployed to the new self-employed -- are disappearing from the 
constituency of the unions, which are becoming increasingly preoccupied with 
moderating the cooperation between a well-protected but numerically declining high-
performance workforce and its employers. 
As the resources available for public social policy decline, in part due to the 
same competitive market pressures that are transforming the workplace, and in part to 
internationally enshrined commitments to deficit reduction and „sound money“, so 
does the capacity of national states to subsidize consensus at the workplace by 
providing for the growing number of people that a „leaner and meaner” high-wage 
economy can no longer employ. Again how countries will respond to this will differ 
according to, among other things, different starting conditions. All of them, however, 
must find ways of restructuring their social welfare expenditures in line with the need 
to make their economies more „competitive” -- in product markets, but perhaps even 
more in factor markets. This may require potentially profound changes, if not in 
 
18On the postwar peace formula see Bornstein and Krieger (1984).  
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spending levels, then in funding methods -- changes that shift the burden from 
potentially mobile employers to more stationary workers and consumers (Scharpf 
1997a). As the number of „good jobs” in the economy continues to decline, along with 
the ability of the state to retire surplus labor at a high level of wage replacement, a 
political space opens up for reforms of the welfare state that in effect lower the bottom 
under the labor market, by allowing and promoting new forms of socially protected 
low-wage employment. Policies of this sort may well find the support of the unions, 
whose further presence in the organized sector of the economy depends on both its 
competitiveness and the capacity of social policy to help unions neutralize the 
potential resistance of their members to cooperative enhancement of productivity. 
 
7. Tendencies of convergence and divergence among national industrial relations 
systems in multi-level Europe thus appear interlocked in a complex pattern. 
Accelerated functional convergence under the pressure of regime competition -- i.e., 
growing functional equivalence -- coincides with slow structural convergence, if at all, 
due to the stickiness of national institutions and the limited intervention capacities of 
supranational governance barred from harmonization and restricted to coordination. As 
functional diversity declines while structural diversity by and large persists, the 
significance of national institutions of industrial relations for the markets they are to 
govern must also decline. One upshot seems to be rising internal diversity within 
national systems, reflecting the weakened capacity of national institutions to override 
market forces and impose a common national pattern of economic governance on 
sectors, firms and regions. Since this affects countries asymmetrically -- those with 
strong institutions more than those whose institutions were always weak in relation to 
market forces -- the result is indeed some sort of convergence, with diversity between 
countries declining due to an increase in diversity within them. 
  Voluntarism and its new peace formula of joint competitiveness may well be 
seen as a convergent European „best practice model” of industrial relations, and 
frequently they are. But the common element of the national industrial relations 
systems separately moving in this direction is rather that, continuing structural 
differences notwithstanding, they are all losing their grip on the market forces they  
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were once designed to control. Indeed this is the way it should be in a process of 
economic liberalization. Where the new „European model” originates is not in social 
institution-building, but in an expansion of market relations. Institutional diversity, 
staunchly defended in the name of cultural diversity, not least by the advocates of 
„healthy competition” between institutions and „best practice benchmarking,” remains 
strong enough to stand in the way of structural harmonization and system-building at 
European level. At the same time it is increasingly less able to prevent functional 
convergence on a market-accommodating, more „flexible” model of the employment 
relationship. It is not by accident that, in this respect as in others, the transformation of 
the national institutions governing the labor market resembles that of the nation-state 
in which the former remain firmly embedded. 
 
8. In the absence of supranational alternatives, national politics and industrial 
relations remain the privileged site for re-regulatory responses to market expansion. 
This is irrespective of the fact that national systems in today’s Europe must operate 
simultaneously under the institutional constraints of a supranational competition 
regime and the economic constraints of international regime competition. National 
industrial relations in particular find themselves embedded in a nation-state that has 
turned over some of its economic governance capacities to supranational institutions 
while others have altogether wasted away, and in an international market that tends to 
reduce national institutional differences to functionally irrelevant cultural 
idiosyncrasies. As pointed out above, there is no reason to believe that this will with 
functional necessity lead to a recovery of re-regulatory capacity at supranational level. 
All it may mean is that a realistic assessment of the potential for social re-regulation 
in the European multi-level polity must above all emphasize its limitations. 
  With supranationalization of social policy and re-nationalization of economic 
policy equally unlikely in the internationally liberalized European political economy, it 
will above all be national industrial relations that will have to deal with the pressures 
for social re-regulation that arise from the operation of an international market. Little 
is known as yet how this will affect them, not least since far too much effort has been 
spent on anticipating the growth of supranational institutions presumably taking over  
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their functions. Two directions of change in national systems are likely to be observed 
concurrently, adjustment of interests to capacities and adjustment of capacities to 
interests, most probably in different combinations in different countries: 
 
(a) As nationally contained industrial relations in an international economy become 
more market-driven, the balance in their concerns between regulation and re-
regulation, or commodification and de-commodification, is likely to shift in favor of 
the former -- with interests in social protection becoming redefined as interests in 
economic competitiveness, and class interests and solidarity being replaced with 
national interests and solidarity. To the extent that this is successful, the raw material 
of economic interest politics becomes compatible with the institutional forms available 
for processing it. „Nationalist” redefinition of interests in an international market may 
open up political opportunities, narrowly circumscribed as they may be, for unions and 
governments to negotiate social pacts that exploit the dialectics of efficiency and 
fairness in the gray zone between market-making and market distortion, and the 
uncertainty of the functional value of social integration in labor markets and 
employment relations.  
 
(b) Efforts are also likely to be made, within the range of the internationally possible, 
to use to the fullest and expand the institutional capacities for social protection of 
nationally contained industrial relations systems. Inevitably such efforts must involve 
modifications of the „four freedoms” of the European integrated market. With growing 
demands for social protection, unions and governments in particular will be pressed to 
search both for national policies capable of insulating national re-regulation from 
international and supranational constraints, as well as for supranational policies 
protecting national re-regulation. Here, the complex, contested and largely unexplored 
dynamics of the multi-level European polity may offer as yet unknown opportunities 
for political innovation. 
  Just as the systemic weakness of national industrial relations in an international 
market is no guarantee for their replacement with supranational industrial relations, the 
fact that there will be no supranational social protection in Europe does not mean that  
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national social protection will suffice to prevent social instability. Indeed a good deal 
of social destabilization -- „flexibility” -- is part and parcel of the liberalization 
program that is at the heart of European integration as we know it, and to this extent 
the political risks that come with it are incurred deliberately. Whether the much 
reduced level of stability and security that a nationally fragmented system of social 
protection can at most provide will be enough to sustain the legitimacy of the 
European political order is far from certain. But then, how much inequality and 
insecurity European societies are willing and able to live with and for how long, 
lowered as their expectations are by the pressure of international markets and the 
demise of their postwar political defenses, is a practical question that is not for the 
social scientist to answer. 
 
The Continuing Importance of National Industrial Relations in Integrated Europe 
  The following five examples illustrate diverse facets of the emerging new 
relationship between the national and the international in European industrial relations. 
In line with the logic of international liberalization, all point to the continuing primary 
importance of the national level, with respect to both the definition and the processing 
of collective interests in the expansion as well as the correction of markets. They also 
indicate profound changes in the operation of national industrial relations, stemming 
from the new institutional environment of multi-level politics and the impact of 
international markets and supranational coordination. In addition to demonstrating 
various aspects of the interaction of national institutions with demands for social 
protection -- in the presence of competing national institutions located in the same 
market, and of supranational institutions regulating national ones -- they also show that 
the task of theorizing the complexities of multi-level industrial relations in Europe still 
remains to be resolved. 
 
1. By far the most important event for European industrial relations in the past two 
decades was the Maastricht Treaty on Monetary Union and the subsequent Stability 
Pact. While both impose stringent requirements of financial orthodoxy on national 
economies aspiring to participate in Monetary Union, meeting these is considered an  
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exclusively national affair. In effect the Treaty charges national governments with 
creating the domestic conditions for a stable austerity policy and overcoming whatever 
political resistance may arise. In a number of countries this has led to more or less 
explicit alliances between the government, business and labor aimed at „making the 
country fit for Monetary Union,” with internationally instituted monetarism bringing 
about to a surprising resurgence of national tripartite concertation (Rhodes 1997). 
  The mechanism behind this is simple but powerful. Once the liberal 
international order that is at the heart of European integration takes shape, it becomes 
an almost irresistible economic and political imperative for countries not to be 
excluded from it. Fulfilling the requirements of participation and survival in the 
integrated European economy may then turn into a national interest strong enough to 
override conflicting class interests. As the political-economic adjustments member 
countries have to undertake are considered their „homework,” the incentives for 
national governments to try to build domestic coalitions around objectives of national 
competitiveness and modernization are considerable. So are the incentives to 
participate even for those groups in society, like labor, that are asked to make 
particularly large sacrifices. 
  Conforming with the ideological notion of „subsidiarity,” the selective 
centralization of functional responsibilities under the Maastricht Treaty assures that 
the main political capacities in integrated Europe remain those of national states 
exposed to competitive markets. Political action thus remains overwhelmingly national 
action, even in an international market and, paradoxically, as the result in part of 
international political agreements. But while the primary importance of national 
political arenas, interests and identities in integrated Europe is confirmed, if only by 
default, the possible outcomes of national politics are limited by tight economic and 
institutional constraints which prescribe „convergence” on a wide range of issues, 
from inflation rates and the size of the national debt to, for example, the organization 
of telecommunications services. The perennial debate whether the national state and 
national politics gain or lose in importance as a result of European integration 
(Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1994) is thus resolved in a surprising way: both is the case 
at the same time.  
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  The strategy of imparting a liberal bias to the integrated European political 
economy by reinforcing the responsibility for it of national politics works even in 
areas where the potential for substituting competitive national interests for conflicting 
group interests is limited. For example, as long as the management of unemployment 
continues to be considered, in the sense of the Essen agreement, as a Hausaufgabe of 
national governments acting under international institutional and market constraints, 
the privileged means for it is to increase labor market „flexibility.” International 
coordination of national employment policies, as envisaged under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, will therefore in all probability mainly strengthen pressures for national 
deregulation, adding to identical pressures that have for some time been emerging 
from the OECD or the Group of Seven. 
 
2. Once Monetary Union will be in place, the common currency will be operated in an 
economically extremely diverse labor market with little inter-regional mobility, and 
the European Central Bank will be faced with a highly organized but extremely -- 
nationally -- fragmented system of wage setting.
19 From the perspective of the Bank, a 
de-unionization of the European economy on the American model must seem as 
unlikely as supranational centralization of wage negotiations. While the former would 
enable the European Central Bank, somewhat like the Federal Reserve in the United 
States,  to tolerate a high employment level without having to be afraid of inflation, the 
latter would at least in theory offer the possibility of concerted wage restraint in 
exchange for an employment-oriented monetary policy -- although without an 
economic government at European level this would be unlikely enough. But given the 
absence not only of employer interest, but also of supranational union capacity in the 
face of enormously heterogeneous national economic conditions, centralization of 
collective bargaining in Europe is not a realistic perspective. As a consequence the 
bank will find itself in the worst possible position with regard to the support for 
monetary stability it can expect from the collective bargaining system. Its monetary 
policy will therefore for the foreseeable future remain restrictive. 
  Given the non-accommodating policy that can be expected from the European 
 
19On the following compare (Peter A. Hall and Robert J. Franzese Jr. 1996).  
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Central Bank, the main problem of fragmented wage-setting under Monetary Union 
will not primarily be inflation caused by „irresponsible” competitive bargaining inside 
non-encompassing bargaining units, as was the case in non-corporatist political 
economies in the 1970s (Crouch 1985). Rather, it will be whether unions in low-wage 
and low-productivity countries will manage to keep their members, especially those 
employed in multinational companies, from insisting on equal pay -- in the much more 
comparable common currency -- with workers in high-wage and high-productivity 
economies. This is because attempts in a low-wage country at correcting „unfair” wage 
differentials are likely to result in a rise in national unemployment. As this might 
undermine the support of the national government, it would exacerbate the pressure for 
institutional reforms making the national labor market more „flexible.” Alternatively, 
national governments in low-wage countries might try to invoke national solidarity to 
get unions to fend off member demands that are satisfied only at high economic, social 
and political costs. (Vice versa, unions in countries with high wages will continue to 
encourage invidious comparisons by workers in countries with lower wages, trying to 
defend their own employment opportunities by persuading potential competitors, in the 
name of international solidarity, to „price themselves out of the market”). National 
decentralization of political responsibility for the employment consequences of 
supranational monetary policy may thus result in unions entering into wage-
moderation alliances with national governments concerned about the political costs of 
further increases in unemployment. 
 
3. Passage of the European Works Councils Directive of 1994 is widely considered a 
breakthrough in the formation of a European industrial relations system (Danis and 
Hoffmann 1995; Hall 1992). But there is also general agreement that the Directive was 
possible only because it refrained from attempting to „harmonize” national systems of 
workplace representation. Indeed all the Directive does is create a mandate for member 
countries to oblige multinational firms based in their jurisdiction to extend a minimum 
of participation rights to workforces in subsidiaries located in other member countries. 
That minimum is identical throughout the European Union, although it is itself 
negotiable among managements and workforces in individual firms. But as the  
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national systems to which  European works councils are added remain as they are, the 
actual status of European works councils within their firms is bound to differ strongly 
between countries (Streeck 1997). Indeed empirical research has found that the 
structures and rights of European works councils tend to be heavily influenced by the 
industrial relations system of their company’s country of origin (Krieger and Bonneton 
1995; Bonneton et al. 1996). 
  European works councils are best understood, not as general European 
institutions, but as international extensions of national industrial relations systems that 
continue to remain distinctly different (Streeck 1997). Reinforcing such difference is 
the fact that, rather than being regulated by law, the details of European works 
councils are worked out through negotiation between the central management of a 
company and a delegation of its multinational workforce. It is not surprising that 
among the latter, the representatives of the company’s home country workforce have 
been found to play the leading role. Indeed just as central management tries to fit the 
European works council into the firm’s -- nationally colored -- corporate culture, home 
country unions tend to treat the new institution as a means of extending their reach 
beyond their respective national borders. How this is done depends, again, on the 
structure of the national industrial relations systems involved, for example on whether 
these have dual or single channel representation and on the degree of inter-union 
competition. Nonetheless, national unions seem to be generally confident that they will 
be able to devise „their” European works councils in the image of their own national 
model of industrial relations, and helping them retain control in and over them. 
  Similar observations can be made with respect to the impending resolution of 
the decades-old political deadlock over workforce representation under European 
company law. The arrangement proposed by the Davignon Commission of Experts in 
the spring of 1997 may ultimately be acceptable in member countries because it limits 
access to European company law to firms that significantly „Europeanize” their 
operations. By thereby foreclosing such access to the vast majority of firms, at least for 
the time being, it leaves national systems of industrial relations intact. In particular, 
legal emigration on a broad scale from national company law with strong workplace 
participation rights to European company law with, inevitably, weaker rights is  
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prevented or postponed, in order to assuage especially German concerns over the 
short- and medium-term stability of the national co-determination system. 
  Further protecting the primacy of national systems is the fact that the exact 
structure of workplace representation in the European Company is to be negotiated 
case by case. In such negotiations, the national workplace participation rights in the 
countries where a European Company’s constituent units are based are likely to serve 
as both political resources for the parties to the negotiation and baselines for an 
eventual settlement. At present, this seems to give unions like the German ones the 
confidence that they will be able to impose effective co-determination arrangements on 
European Companies that grow out of the German system or have significant German 
elements, or at least to make such companies guarantee the acquis sociale in their 
national sub-entities. Still, like the European works councils, the negotiated character 
of company-level workforce participation under the Davignon model would imply a 
wide variety of company-specific hybrids of national systems rooted in national 
regimes and extending these, in nationally specific ways, beyond their borders. 
  As under both the European Works Councils Directive and the proposed 
participation arrangement for the European Company, national systems of worker 
representation remain formally unchanged, the pressure of regime competition on them 
continues in principle unabated. In the absence of harmonization, managements 
continue to be able to threaten to relocate production to European countries with 
weaker participation rights, where workforce representatives can be more easily 
persuaded to make concessions. Moreover, the negotiation of company-specific 
representation arrangements will inevitably be subject to imperatives of 
competitiveness. At the same time, the possibility to extend national industrial 
relations regimes internationally through custom-made arrangements within individual 
firms may take some of the edge out of regime competition, balancing part of the 
pressures on national systems to adapt to a more competitive international 
environment, by endowing them with a however limited capacity to adapt that 
environment to themselves.
20 
 
20There is in addition the possibility of European union confederations, at intersectoral as well 
as sectoral level, acting as promoters of institutional convergence by influencing the 
negotiations between management and labor on European representation arrangements at  
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4. The Social Protocol that was appended to the Treaty of Maastricht gave the 
organized „Social Partners,” business and labor, a formal role in social policy 
legislation at European level.
21 By some this was regarded as a smart move of an 
activist European Commission seeking to put pressure on a Council unable or 
unwilling to agree on meaningful social policies (Addison and Siebert 1994). Others 
attributed the event to a shared desire of unions and employers to appropriate between 
them a policy area in which they knew better than Council and Commission, providing 
themselves with an institutional capacity to discover common interests and prevent 
incompetent intervention by supranational and intergovernmental bodies (Bockmann 
1995). In either view, as a bureaucratic tool or as a result of joint assertion of a right to 
industrial self-governance, the Social Dialogue appeared as a new kind of corporatist 
structure at the European level, adding to the array of existing supranational and 
international institutions that, presumably, were about to supersede national social 
policy and industrial relations. 
  None of these interpretations sits well with the fact that, since it came into 
force in 1993, the co-decision procedure produced no more than two agreements, one 
on parental leave
22 and another on part-time work,
23 neither of which seems to have 
made a discernible difference for the legal order of only a single member country. 
Received explanations for this point mostly to the difficult politics of institution-
building in integrated Europe (Falkner 1996). The lack of substance of the parental 
leave directive is usually attributed to a need to use an uncontroversial subject to try 
out and establish the new institution. Similarly, the directive on part-time work is said 
to have served to impress the Intergovernmental Conference of 1997, which needed to 
be convinced to continue the procedure and incorporate it fully in the Treaty. While 
this assumes unions and employers to have identical institutional interests, the meager 
outcome of their negotiations may also reflect a compromise between unions trading 
 
company level. Establishing the importance of this factor requires detailed research. 
21This part of my argument is informed by current research by Ute Knaak. 
22See annex of the Council Directive on the Framework Agreement on Parental Leave 
Concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, COM (96) 26 final 31.1.1996 
23See annex of the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Framework Agreement on Part-
time Work Concluded by UNICE; CEEP and the ETUC, COM (97) 392 final 23.7.1997  
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concessions on substance in return for employers accepting the principle of European 
negotiations, and employers making concessions on principle in return for pro forma 
European legislation putting to rest potentially dangerous political issues (Keller and 
Soerries 1997). 
  In the European Union symbolic politics is always a possibility. It is also 
conceivable that apparently irrelevant European-level regulations may in fact be 
designed to prevent countries from lowering their standards in the future. But as time 
passes, and in view of the continuing absence of a meaningful legislative agenda for 
the Social Dialogue, other hypotheses begin to offer themselves. Unthinkable in the 
functionalist world of mainstream integration theory, the creation of the Social 
Dialogue may have served, not to expedite supranational social policy, but to relieve 
Commission and Council of an intractable set of issues, by moving these to a less 
politically exposed new arena. There it may have been received especially by the 
employers, not as a welcome opportunity to develop a corporatist social partnership at 
European level, but as an arrangement returning social policy to unanimous decision-
making -- this time between the social partners -- at the very moment when in the 
Council it was partly coming under qualified majority voting. The institutionalization 
of the Social Dialogue in the Maastricht Treaty would thus above all have amounted to 
a restoration of the veto in social policy, wielded not by nation-states but, primarily, by 
organized employers concerned about a potential social policy activism of European 
political bodies.  
  This still leaves open the question of how the co-decision procedure works in 
practice, and exactly where the interests of unions and employers are likely to meet in 
the everyday operation of the new arena given the way it is constituted. Here one may 
surmise that the main actual functions of the post-Maastricht Social Dialogue, apart 
from its contribution to the organizational development of the European peak 
associations, UNICE and ETUC, relate to the emerging relationship between national 
and international industrial relations in integrated Europe. More specifically, the 
modal type of measures that the Euro-corporatist machinery may be poised to generate 
may be one that protects the institutional and political equilibrium of the national 
systems of capital-labor-relations, by sterilizing supranational policy with respect to  
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its national institutional consequences. 
  One central aspect of institutional diversity in integrated Europe is that in some 
countries certain social policy issues are dealt with by legislation whereas in others 
they are regulated by agreement between the social partners (Höland 1995). Where the 
latter is the case, employers and unions must equally be concerned about the prospect 
of European regulation taking bargaining matter out of their hands, especially where 
issues are significant for the national give-and-take and the balance of concessions 
between the two sides. Close involvement of the „social partners“ in European social 
policy-making, represented by organizations that in turn represent national peak 
associations, may be the best way of protecting national corporatist arrangements from 
a possible etatistic bias on the part of the Commission and, in particular, the members 
states sitting in the Council. 
  Regulation by agreement between the social partners at European level offers 
the affiliates of the European peak associations of business and labor an opportunity to 
block legislation that diminishes their standing and upsets their mutual relations in 
their respective national systems. It thus enables nationally organized interests to 
defend the institutions to which they have grown accustomed over a long time, 
especially against a Council of Ministers now potentially deciding with qualified 
majority vote. Euro-corporatism, rather than moving collective interests in economic 
governance to the supranational level, as suggested by traditional integration theory, 
would in effect safeguard the diversity of national institutions, especially the various 
and diverse national corporatisms. While on the surface serving no visible purpose, 
legislative measures like the directives on parental leave or part-time work may in fact 
defend the integrity of national institutional practices embedded in a multi-level 
political system. 
 
5. The most telling illustration of the continuing primacy of national institutions in 
European industrial relations is perhaps offered by the Posted Workers Directive, 
which seems to be ideally suited for exploring the institutional capacities of European 
multi-level social policy.
24 Confirming their general weakness, it appears that a main 
 
24 I am drawing here on work of Werner Eichhorst.  
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reason why the Directive
25 could at all be passed was the prior existence of various 
pieces of national and international law relevant to the subject, which made the actual 
„value-added” of the Directive much smaller than may seem at first glance. Observing 
this is not to detract from the formidable political skill that had to be brought to bear 
on the matter before the Directive could finally become law (Biagi 1996). Quite to the 
contrary, the case shows that, even where a major member country and an 
extraordinarily knowledgeable and energetic Council president put all their weight 
behind a legislative project, progress in European social policy at supranational level 
depends on exceptionally favorable circumstances, and even where these exist remains 
confined to very modest amendments on the margins of already existing legal 
arrangements. 
  In particular, the Posted Workers Directive was passed on the background of a 
well-developed body of international private law, especially collision law, that had 
been created outside the framework of the European Union. In 1991 the Convention of 
Rome, which had been concluded as early as 1980, became legally binding on all EU 
member states as a result of individual accession (Desmazières de Séchelles 1993). By 
the time the Internal Market for services was completed, it was already an established 
principle that countries may make a wide range of social provisions binding on foreign 
firms posting workers on their territory. It may have been questionable whether such 
provisions included the national minimum wage, especially given the new freedom of 
competition in service provision after 1992. On the other hand, the posting of workers 
had in principle been possible in Europe since 1970, and the European Court of Justice 
had, in a number of decisions long before any Directive had been proposed, ruled that 
European Union member countries have a right to enforce their „public order” on 
foreign firms that carry out work on their territory, regardless of whether their workers 
were employed under the law of a different member country.
26 One such ruling in 
particular had, thirdly, paved the way for French legislation in 1993 and 1994, prior to 
the Directive which was passed in 1996, which extended all generally binding 
 
25Directive 96/71/EC of December 16, 1996, on the Posting of Workers in the Framework of 
Provision of Services, EC Official Journal L 18, p. 1ff, of 21 January, 1997. 
26ECJ Judgements Seco/Desquenne/Giral and Seco/EVI of February 3, 1982, Cases 62/81 and 
63/81; ECJ Judgement Rush Portuguesa/OMI of March 27, 1990, Case 113/89; ECJ  
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collective agreements, including wage agreements, to all workers on French territory.
27 
Whatever the Directive added to the regulation of employment in Europe was added 
against and to this background. 
  Apart from this, the Posted Workers Directive seems to have been successful 
mainly for two reasons. The first was that it managed to turn the issue of protection for 
workers and social regimes in high-wage countries into one of equal protection for 
posted workers from low-wage countries and, simultaneously, of fair competition 
among domestic and foreign firms. With respect to the former, the Directive obliges 
member countries to ensure that posted workers are not paid less than what national 
workers are entitled to. With respect to fair competition, the Directive allows countries 
to require non-national firms to pay a national minimum wage to posted workers only 
if the same requirement applies also to domestic firms -- thus protecting foreign firms 
from being bound by rules that do not equally bind their domestic competitors, but 
also protecting domestic firms from having to follow rules that do not also apply to 
their foreign competitors. Put differently, what the Directive prohibits is for a country 
to have a binding minimum wage and not extend it to posted workers, as well as to 
impose a minimum wage on foreign firms that is not also binding on national firms 
and vice versa. While on the surface this is defined as a matter of equal treatment for 
both workers and firms -- or of mobility of labor and fair competition -- in effect it 
allows high-wage countries to limit the competitive advantage of foreign firms and 
thereby protect their own acquis sociale. 
  Otherwise, however, the Directive strictly refrains from intervention in the 
internal affairs of national systems of industrial relations and social protection, and this 
seems to be the second main reason why it was ultimately successful. How a binding 
minimum wage is set and enforced, whether by industrial agreement or by legislation, 
is for countries themselves to decide, and so is the level of that wage. Even more 
importantly, while countries are allowed under the Directive to have an obligatory 
minimum wage -- and are then required to extend it to posted workers to ensure both 
equal treatment and fair competition -- they are also allowed not to have one, in which 
 
Judgement Vander Elst/OMI of August 9, 1994, Case 43/93 
27Loi Quinquennale No. 93-1313 of December 20, 1993. See IDS European Report 397, 
January 1995, pp. 18-19  
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case foreign firms pay their posted workers what they have to under their national 
conditions, provided such conditions exist. While the Directive does restore, or 
preserve, a national capacity for social regulation within an international environment 
of liberalized markets, it does so only by not forcing receiving countries to let 
employers of posted workers pay these less than what domestic employers cannot 
avoid paying; what a country makes of this, if at all, is exclusively its national affair.  
Rather than a common supranational floor under the common international market, 
social protection of this sort consists in a set of nationally specific arrangements 
member countries may choose or not choose to have, depending on what their internal 
political process supports and provided its terms and conditions are compatible with 
the „four freedoms” of the integrated market. Countries that prefer to have their social 
structures driven by market forces cannot be prevented from acting accordingly, even 
if this may place more socially regulated countries at a competitive disadvantage. 
  What the model of supranationally vindicated but nationally instituted  social 
protection that is exemplified by the Posted Workers Directive can accomplish is a 
matter of considerable interest. Instead of setting identical standards for the integrated 
European market, supranational social policy of this sort merely preserves the option 
for countries to create nationally specific social rights (that they must then extend also 
to non-nationals). Given the wide range of differences in national politics and 
institutions within Europe, such rights are bound to vary between countries, exposing 
them to regime competition. Moreover, as the international institutions that envelope 
and regulate national polities and industrial relations offer new and very likely 
asymmetrical constraints and opportunities to the domestic actors among which social 
protection must be negotiated, they are likely to change the equilibrium within national 
systems, making the outcome of national efforts at re-regulation less than predictable. 
  How this may work is shown by the German case (see also Soerries 1997). 
German construction wages are among the highest in Europe, which raises the stakes 
for the buyers of construction services in market liberalization. Moreover, unlike 
France the German system knows no legal minimum wage, and in any case the liberal 
party in the government coalition would not have agreed to one. Wages in Germany 
are set by industrial agreement. Although coverage is extensive, it remains in principle  
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possible for employers not to join an employers association and thereby remain outside 
the agreement. While agreements may be declared generally binding by the Minister of 
Labor -- which makes them apply also to employers not affiliated to the respective 
employers association -- this requires the consent of the peak associations of both 
business and labor. Also, it is usually not done for wage agreements. 
  On this background, all the German legislator was able to come up with was a 
law obliging foreign construction firms to honor German wage agreements provided 
that these had been declared generally binding.
28 This gave an opening to forces 
interested in low construction prices, or in liberalization of the German economy in 
general, which lobbied the Federation of German Employers Associations (BDA) to 
veto the Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung of the construction industry wage 
agreement. Had they prevailed, Germany would not have been able to set a binding 
minimum wage for construction workers that would have satisfied European law; it 
would as a consequence have had to allow foreign construction firms to pay their 
posted workers on their own terms. 
  After long and contorted negotiations with the employers, the government and, 
indirectly, the BDA, the German construction union did get its wage agreement 
declared generally binding. But for this it had to accept insertion in it of a low-wage 
category, split between West and East Germany and considerably below the lowest 
wage in the old agreement
29. Originally this category was to be limited to posted 
workers, which would thus have been paid more than in their home countries but less 
than German workers. As arguably this constituted discrimination on the basis of 
nationality, it would probably not have survived a legal test. But this aspect of the 
matter has already become moot since, as might have been predicted, growing 
numbers of -- mostly unskilled -- German workers are being assigned to the new 
category, especially in the East where a majority of employers have abandoned or 
never joined employers associations, or have long disregarded the agreement signed by 
 
28Gesetz über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen bei grenzüberschreitenden Dienstleistungen, 
February 26, 1996, Bundesgesetzblatt 1996, Teil I, Nr. 11 vom 29. 2 .96, pp. 227ff. See 
Lorenz (1996); Hanau (1997).  
29See various editions of European Industrial Relations Report (EIRR), especially No. 267, 
April 1996, p. 7; No. 268, May 1996, pp. 14-15; No. 269, June 1996, pp. 6f.; No. 271, August 
1996, p. 6f.; No. 273, October 1996, p. 5.  
 
  33 
the latter on their behalf. 
  European law of the kind of the Posted Workers Directive does allow a 
national re-regulatory response to the social consequences of market liberalization. But 
especially in a high-wage setting like Germany, where social protection is more 
expensive than in competing countries, this may not nearly be enough for preserving 
the old regime. While national political capacities were sufficient to prevent full 
liberalization, significant concessions had to be made. The demanding European 
conditions for national re-regulation to be compatible with market freedoms offered 
proponents of liberalization new opportunities that shifted the balance of power in 
their favor, above all by giving them a veto over the setting of a minimum wage 
recognized as binding under European law. Continuing differences in construction 
prices in European countries keep alive the interest of the users of construction 
services in Germany in strong international competition, hoping for lower costs and an 
improved competitive position in their own product markets. At the same time, the 
power of  German unions to defend their established wage regime by strike is 
weakened by increased market access of foreign firms whose workforce they are 
unable to organize, at a time when high unemployment, especially in the East, has 
already severely undermined union capacity. Having to be reconstructed under these 
conditions and in accordance with the liberal competition regime of the Internal 
Market, the institutional order of the German construction sector is bound to change 
significantly, even though it does not have to disappear altogether. 
 
Conclusion 
  National industrial relations in Europe are not about to be absorbed into 
supranational industrial relations. Supranational institutions of capital-labor relations 
will continue to develop, but more as extensions of rather than substitutes for national 
institutions. Structural diversity between the latter will persist, constituting an 
important roadblock to supranational harmonization. But the changed institutional 
environment of national industrial relations systems, including in particular the loss of 
monetary and fiscal policy capacity on the part of European nation-states, will change 
the modus operandi of national systems, and so will regime competition in the  
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integrated international market. In the process the capacities of national systems to 
override and correct market forces will diminish, in the longer run very probably 
leading to growing structural diversity within national systems as well as increasing 
functional convergence between them, with a new „peace formula“ emerging between 
capital and labor that emphasizes joint interests in national or company 
competitiveness. 
  Pressures for social re-regulation of the employment relationship will continue 
to arise in spite, and indeed as a consequence, of international liberalization. Absent 
suitable receptacles at supranational level, such pressures will have to be 
accommodated mostly by national regimes of industrial relations and social policy. 
Given the changed institutional and economic conditions under which these must 
operate, demands for social re-regulation will tend to be articulated in terms of the 
social preconditions of competitive efficiency -- their chance of being heard 
increasing with the estimated economic costs of discontent, and with the perceived 
uncertainties in the operation of socially uncorrected markets. The politics of the 
market-embedded national industrial relations systems of integrated Europe will thus 
amount to an exploration of the social limits of liberalization and the minimum social 
requirements of a stable market economy -- of the concessions capital has to make in 
an internationalized market in exchange for national cooperation and social peace. In 
the process new alliances will emerge within and across classes, which will likely 
differ from country to country. 
  In the absence of realistic possibilities for pushing social re-regulation 
upwards to the supranational level, its prospects depend on a re-building under the 
new conditions of national capacities for market correction. In integrated Europe this 
requires supranational license and, perhaps, facilitation, with European coordination 
of structurally diverse national systems representing the most important tool for 
putting a brake on market-driven functional convergence. Industrial relations always 
served purposes of both market-making and market-correction. But in the market-
embedded national industrial relations systems of the European Union, the balance 
between the two is bound to shift in favor of the former and away from the latter. As 
illustrated, the comparatively modest re-regulatory responses that the fragmented  
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industrial relations of integrated Europe supports include, or may be included in, 
tripartite national modernization coalitions which, under EMU, may turn into national 
wage moderation alliances; the building of coordinating institutional interfaces 
between national systems, like the European works councils; the safeguarding of 
national patterns of interest politics through their expansion into the European arena, 
as in the Social Dialogue; and the use of European legislation to enable member 
countries to protect their social structures from destabilization by the international 
competition regime that is the heart of European integration. 
  Future research, and even more so: future political praxis, will have to 
establish the true potential of national re-regulatory responses to international 
liberalization. Recognition of their inherent limitations should not blind one for 
contradictory tendencies or potentially significant national and sectoral variations. 
Again the example of the German settlement of the posted workers issue appears 
instructive. While the union had to accept a considerable lowering of the old 
minimum wage as established by industrial agreement, the combined effect of the 
Posted Workers Directive, of the German law passed simultaneously with it, and of 
the declaration of the new wage regime as generally binding ensures for the first time 
that all construction firms in Germany, in the employers association or out, have to 
obey by a legally enforceable minimum wage. Undoubtedly by the old standards, this 
wage is low. But it does apply also to the large number of firms in East Germany that 
had for long ceased to abide by the collective agreement, paying their workers even 
less than what is now, after the European developments, the legally binding minimum. 
While the grand picture may be clear, this is to say, its details justify careful 
inspection as they offer interesting variety and, sometimes, productive surprises.  
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